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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to extend classical logic with
a generalized notion of inductive definition support-
ing positive and negative induction, to investigate the
properties of this logic, its relationships to other logics
in the area of non-monotonic reasoning, logic program-
ming and deductive databases, and to show its applica-
tion for knowledge representation by giving a typology
of definitional knowledge.
Introduction
Since the early days of Computer Science, when John
McCarty started to investigate the role of logic for com-
puting and artificial intelligence, the key attraction of
logic was the promise of a natural representation of
knowledge. By the end of the seventies, it had be-
come clear that representing common sense knowledge
in classical logic, despite its clear and well-understood
intuitive reading, was a complex task. Two major prob-
lems were seen as the causes: first, very often common
sense knowledge turns out to be partial and incomplete.
Second, in many applications an unrealistic amount of
axioms seemed necessary to represent the human knowl-
edge; the prototypical example in this respect is the
frame problem (McCarthy & Hayes 1969). To solve
these problems, non-monotonic logics such as circum-
scription and default logic, incorporate strong logical
closure principles that allow to reason about partial and
incomplete knowledge, and allow a compact represen-
tation of human knowledge.
This paper defines and investigates a conservative
extension of classical logic with a less general non-
monotonic closure principle: the principle of defini-
tion and inductive definition. In the context of non-
monotonic reasoning, definitions have received little at-
tention so far. This is remarkable for several reasons.
The study of definitions in knowledge representation
has a long tradition which extends to the origins of
Western philosophy. The problem of defining a natural
kind as studied by the ancient Greek philosophers is in
many ways an instance avant la lettre of the general
problem of common sense knowledge representation.
Also in the context of modern AI, the study of the
role of definitions in common sense knowledge repre-
sentation has a long tradition. As an outcome of a
series of investigations into the semantics of seman-
tic networks1, Brachman and Levesque (Brachman &
Levesque 1982) observed that an important component
of expert knowledge is knowledge of the defining prop-
erties of concepts, and that it is crucial to distinguish
between defining properties of concepts and assertional
knowledge on concepts. Description logics are based on
this idea, and consist of a Tbox to represent definitional
knowledge and an Abox to represent assertional knowl-
edge.
Another area related to nonmonotonic reasoning in
which definitions have been prominent is in the con-
text of logic programming and abductive (or open)
logic programming. One of the original ideas on the
declarative semantics of logic programs with negation
as failure was to interpret a logic program as a defini-
tion of its predicates. This view is underlying Clark’s
completion semantics (Clark 1978). In (Denecker 1995;
Denecker & De Schreye 1995; Van Belleghem, Denecker,
& De Schreye 1997), this view was extended to abduc-
tive logic programs and open logic programs and the
relation with description logics was shown.
In the context of non-monotonic reasoning, Reiter
(Reiter 1996) and Amati et al (Amati, Carlucci Aiello,
& Pirri 1997) observed that an important method for
analysis and computation in common sense knowledge
representation is to compile non-monotonic theories
into first order definitions (i.e. Clark completions).
They argue that the advantages of this compilation
are that it clarifies the meaning of the original theory
and that it yields theories that are better suited for
computational purposes. Recently (Denecker, Thesei-
der Dupre´, & Van Belleghem 1998) and (Ternovskaia
1998) showed a strong correspondence between induc-
tion and causality and investigated the use of inductive
definitions to represent temporal and causal knowledge.
The above suggests that the study of induction and
inductive definitions could provide a valuable contribu-
tion to the area of common sense knowledge representa-
tion, nonmonotonic reasoning and logic programming.
The study of induction could be defined as the study
1See (Reichgelt 1991) for a discussion of this topic.
of construction techniques in mathematics. In general,
an inductive definition defines a relation (or a collection
of relations) through a constructive process of iterating
a recursive recipe that defines new instances of the rela-
tion in terms of the presence or absence of other tuples
of the same relation or other relations. The recipe natu-
rally defines an operator: this operator maps a relation
(or set of relations) to the relation (or set of) that can
be obtained by applying the recipe.
Standard work was done by Moschovakis
(Moschovakis 1974) and Aczel (Aczel 1977). These
treatments study the theoretical expressivity of positive
or monotone induction. One spin-off of this field is
fixpoint logic (Gurevich & Shelah 1986), a subarea of
databases (Abiteboul, Hull, & Vianu 1995). As shown
in (Denecker 1998), the abstract positive inductive
definition logic defined in (Aczel 1977) is formally
isomorphic with the formalism of propositional Horn
programs under least model semantics. In the case of
Horn programs, the associated operator corresponds to
the immediate consequence operator.
In mathematical applications, also non-monotone
forms of induction can be distinguished:
• stratified induction and a generalisation, induction in
well-founded sets. In stratified induction the domain
of the defined concept(s) can be stratified (possibly
in transfinite number of levels) such that higher level
instances of the concept are defined positively or neg-
atively in terms of lower level instances of the pred-
icate. Two well-known examples are the following
definition of even numbers:
even ::
{
even(0)←
even(s(x))← ¬even(x)
}
and the definition of the ordinal powers of a monotone
operator as used in the Tarski-Kleene least fixpoint
theory.
• induction in the context of well-founded sets. Here
a concept at a higher level of the set is defined in
terms of the concept at lower levels in a monotone
or nonmonotone way. An example of definition with
positive and negative induction in the context of well-
founded sets is given in (Denecker 1998): the defini-
tion of depth or rank of an element in a well-founded
set: it is the least ordinal strictly larger than the
depths of strictly less elements. Also the definition of
ordinal powers can be seen as an application of this
principle.
Inflationary fixpoint logic is a well-known extension
of fixpoint logic for nonmonotone operators. However,
as argued in (Denecker 1998), this extension does not
match the intuition of non-monotone induction. For
example, the semantics of the nonmonotone definition
of even in inflationary semantics would be the set of all
natural numbers. In general, the inflationary fixpoint
is not even a fixpoint of the original operator, and if it
is, it is not necessarily a minimal fixpoint.
Formalizations of definitions with positive and nega-
tive induction were investigated in the area of Iterated
Inductive Definitions (Feferman 1970; Buchholz, Fefer-
man, & Sieg 1981). As argued in (Denecker 1998), the
intuition of such formalisms is simple and natural and
corresponds with the many notions of stratification in
logic programming. Yet, it is also shown that encoding
even simple inductive definitions is extremely tedious;
knowledge representation in such systems is practically
impossible.
(Denecker 1998) presents a knowledge theoretic study
of a generalized principle of inductive definition in the
abstract setting of an (infinitary) propositional logic.
This definition logic extends Aczel’s infinitary proposi-
tional logic for positive induction(Aczel 1977)2. When
extending the notion of inductive definition to unre-
stricted forms of induction, a challenging problem arises
of defining a uniform semantical principle that assigns
the right semantics to all kinds of inductive definitions.
The main contribution of (Denecker 1998) was to show
that the principle of well-founded model in logic pro-
gramming (Van Gelder, Ross, & Schlipf 1991) is the
suitable mathematical principle of generalized induc-
tive definition. The well-founded model is obtained as
the least fixpoint of the 3-valued stable operator (Przy-
musinski 1990b). The latter operator is a general and
robust implementation of the principle of positive in-
duction; negative induction is dealt with by iterating
this positive induction operator in a least fixpoint com-
putation. As a consequence, this semantics generalizes
all well-known ways of defining concepts. It coincides
with least fixpoint and least model semantics in the
context of positive induction; it coincides with itera-
tion of the positive induction in the context of iterated
(or stratified) systems of inductive definitions; it coin-
cides with Clark completion semantics in case of non-
inductive definitions and inductive definitions on a well-
founded set; beyond these classes, it gives the intended
meaning to mixtures of positive and negative induction
in semi-well-founded sets3.
The present paper is concerned with the role of in-
duction in common sense knowledge representation and
the definition of a knowledge representation logic based
on inductive definitions. To this end, the abstract logic
of (Denecker 1998) is lifted to a predicate logic suit-
able for representing this generalized notion of induc-
tive definitions in the context of uncertainty and incom-
plete knowledge. I investigate formal properties and
methodological guidelines of this logic, important from
the point of view of knowledge representation. A num-
ber of important applications of this logic are sketched.
The relationship with many other logics are discussed,
2Both logics are abstract in the sense that infinitary the-
ories and rules are considered.
3A semi-order ≤ is a reflexive, transitive relation and
defines an equivalence relation x ≡ y iff x ≤ y∧y ≤ x). The
set of equivalence classes is a poset. A semi-order is well-
founded if the poset of equivalence classes is well-founded.
in particular logic programming and some of its exten-
sions.
By lack of space, proofs of all theorems are omitted.
An abstract logic of inductive definitions
In (Denecker 1998), I proposed an extension of Aczel’s
logic for general monotone and non-monotone induc-
tive definitions. The result is isomorphic with the for-
malism of infinitary propositional logic programs (with
negation) under well-founded semantics. An abstract
inductive definition (ID) D in this logic defines a set
Defined(D) of symbols, called the set of defined sym-
bols, by a set of rules of the form
p← B
where p is a defined atom and B a set of positive or neg-
ative literals. The other atoms are called open atoms;
their set is denoted Open(D).
In (Denecker 1998) it was argued that Przymusinski’s
3-valued extension (Przymusinski 1990a; Przymusinski
1990b) of Gelfond and Lifschitz’ stable model opera-
tor (Gelfond & Lifschitz 1988) is a general and robust
implementation of the principle of positive induction,
and that its least fixpoint, the well-founded model (Van
Gelder, Ross, & Schlipf 1991) naturally extends the
ideas of Iterated Inductive Definitions and gives the
right semantics to generalized inductive definitions.
In general, given an ID D and an interpretation I of
the open symbols of D, there is a unique well-founded
model extending I. This model will be denoted I
D
.
An interpretation is a model of D iff M = Mo
D
where
Mo is the restriction of M to the open symbols. In
general, a model of an inductive definition is a partial
(3-valued) interpretation. However, for broad classes of
definitions, the well-founded model is known to be total
(2-valued). These are the cases that are of interest in
this paper.
ID-logic: classical logic with definitions
This section defines a conservative extension of classical
logic with definitions. An ID-logic theory T (based on
some logical alphabet Σ) consists of a set of classical
logic sentences and a set of definitions. A definition D
is a pair of a set Defined(D) of predicates and a set
Rules(D) of rules of the form:
p(t)← F
where p ∈ Defined(D) and F an arbitrary first or-
der formula based on Σ. Predicates of Defined(D) are
called the defined predicates of D; other predicates are
called open predicates of D. A definition defines the de-
fined predicates in terms of the open predicates. More
precisely, given some state of the open predicates, the
rule set of the definition gives an exhaustive enumer-
ation of the cases in which the defined predicates are
true; any defined atom not covered by a rule is defined
as false.
A definition will be formally represented as in the
example:
even, odd ::
{
even(0)←
even(S(x))← odd(x)
odd(S(x))← even(x)
}
This is one definition defining two predicates simulta-
neously.
In ID-logic, definitions are considered as sentences.
An ID-logic theory based on Σ consists of sentences
and may contain different definitions, even for the same
predicates. An Σ-interpretation is a model of an ID-
logic theory iff it is a model of all its sentences. So, it
suffices to define what is a model of a definition.
The semantics for propositional definitions of section
3 can be lifted easily to the predicate case by use of the
grounding technique: the technique of reducing a predi-
cate definition to an infinitary propositional definition4.
In the context of ID-logic, this grounding of a definition
is constructed using the domain and functions of some
(general non-Herbrand) interpretation I.
To define the grounding the following terminology is
needed. Given an alphabet Σ and a Σ-interpretation I,
define the alphabet ΣI by adding the domain elements
of I as constants to Σ5. I is naturally extended to ΣI
by defining I(x) = x for each domain element x of I.
The evaluation of a ground term t of ΣI (which may
contain domain elements of I) is defined inductively as
usual, and is denoted |t|I . Likewise, truth value of a
sentence of ΣI is defined by the usual truth recursion.
Given some partial (3-valued) interpretation I and
a definition D, Io denotes the restriction of I to the
constant, functor and open predicate symbols ofD. AtI
denotes the set of all atoms p(d) where p is a defined
predicate of D and d is a tuple of domain elements of
I. A ground instance of a rule p(t[x]) ← F [x] with x
the tuple of all its free variables, is a rule p(t[d])← F [d]
obtained by substituting domain elements d for x.
The intuition to get the grounding is as follows. We
must replace a rule-instance p(t[d]) ← F [d] by some
logically equivalent set of propositional rules A ← B
where B is a set of literals. We will select A = p(|t[d]|I)
and B any set of literals of AtI such that if all elements
of B were true, then F [d] would be true. Or, the bodies
of the grounding correspond to the partial models of the
rule body F [d].
Define a consistent set S of literals of AtI as a set
of positive or negative literals based on AtI that does
not contain a pair of complementary literals p(d),¬p(d).
4In (Gelder 1993), an alternative way of defining the well-
founded semantics of predicate rules is proposed; it is based
on a different treatment of positive and negative occurrences
of predicates in the body of rules. I believe both techniques
are equivalent but haven’t proven this.
5Note that ΣI may be infinite, even non-countable. This
is mathematically and philosophically non-problematic be-
cause ΣI is purely used as a semantic device, namely to
define the grounding.
Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between
partial interpretations extending Io and consistent sets
of AtI -literals. Each partial interpretation J extending
Io defines a unique consistent set SJ of all literals l of
AtI that are true in J . Vice versa, each consistent set
S defines a unique partial interpretation JS extending
Io such that JS(l) = t iff l ∈ S. Moreover, JSJ = J .
Definition 1 Given an interpretation I, the grounding
of a definition D w.r.t. I, denoted I-grounding(D), is
the propositional definition defining all atoms of AtI
and consisting of all rules
p(|t[d]|I)← SJ
such that p(t[d]) ← F [d] is a ground instance of a rule
of D and J is a partial model of F [d] extending Io.
Definition 2 A 3-valued interpretation I is a justified
interpretation of D iff SI is the 3-valued (well-founded)
model of the grounding of D w.r.t. I. I is a justified
interpretation of a theory T iff it is a justified interpre-
tation of all its definitions and a (3-valued) model of
the classical logic sentences of T .
An interpretation I is a model of a definition D, resp.
theory T , iff it is a total (i.e. 2-valued) justified inter-
pretation of D, resp. T .
The above model theory is based on total, general
non-Herbrand models. As a consequence, ID-logic is
an extension of classical logic. The restriction to to-
tal models is not only necessary to get a extension of
classical logic, but also because of methodological con-
straints on the use of definitions, as explained in the
next section.
Example 1 The first example shows that different def-
initions are independent and interact in a monotonic
way. Consider the theory consisting of three definitions.

father ::
{
father(x, y)← parent(x, y)∧
male(x)
}
mother ::
{
mother(x, y)← parent(x, y)∧
female(x)
}
parent ::
{
parent(x, y)← father(x, y)
parent(x, y)← mother(x, y)
}


Note that in the first definition, father depends on
parent, while in the third, parent depends on father.
However, the semantics of a set of definitions is mono-
tonically composed of the semantics of its definitions.
Since none of these definitions is recursive, each is
equivalent with its completed definition. Consequently,
this triple of definitions is equivalent with the FOL the-
ory:{
father(x, y)↔ parent(x, y) ∧male(x)
mother(x, y)↔ parent(x, y) ∧ female(x)
parent(x, y)↔ father(x, y) ∨mother(x, y)
}
One can observe that if male(x)↔ ¬female(x) holds,
then the definition of parent is redundant.
Compare this theory with the simultaneous definition
obtained by merging the three definitions in one:

father,mother, parent ::

father(x, y)← parent(x, y) ∧male(x)
mother(x, y)← parent(x, y) ∧ female(x)
parent(x, y)← father(x, y)
parent(x, y)← mother(x, y)




This new definition is positive recursive. This has the
unintended effect that in each model, father, mother
and parent are interpreted as the empty relationships.
Example 2 A theory may contain more than one def-
inition for the same concept. E.g.

even :: { even(0)← ¬odd(x) }
even ::
{
even(0)
even(s(s(x)))← even(x)
} 
The first definition defines even as the complement of
odd. In itself, it does not define even nor odd. The
second definition defines even by the usual positive re-
cursion. The combination of both definitions defines
both even and odd.
Definition 3 A definition is recursive iff a defined
predicate appears in the body of a rule. A definition is
positive recursive iff all occurrences of the defined pred-
icates in the body of the rules are positive (i.e. occur
in the scope of an even number of negations). A simul-
taneous definition defines more than one predicate. A
stratified definition is one in which the defined predi-
cates can be semi-ordered such that each defined pred-
icate occurring positively, resp. negatively, in the body
of a rule is less, resp. strictly less, than the predicate
in the head.
A definition hierarchy is a set D of definitions such
that each predicate is defined in at most one definition
of D and D can be ordered such that each open predi-
cate appearing in a definition is not defined in a later
definition.
Below, I define the concept of a well-founded defini-
tion. This concept generalizes the principle of definition
in a well-founded set.
Definition 4 A definition D is well-founded in some
collection I of total interpretations of the open predi-
cates of D iff for each I ∈ I, there exists a well-founded
order on the atoms of AtI such that for each ground in-
stance p(t[d])← F [d], the body F [d] has the same truth
value in all partial interpretations that extend I and are
identical on all atoms less than p(|t[d]|I).
The following theorem states an interesting property
of well-founded definitions.
Theorem 1 If D is well-founded in I, then each jus-
tified interpretation M of D extending an element I
of I is total (and hence a model) and coincides with
the least model of the 3-valued completion of D (Fitting
1985) extending I. M is the unique model of the Clark
completion (Clark 1978) of D extending I.
Example 3 Consider the definition of even numbers:
even ::
{
even(0)←
even(S(x))← ¬even(x)
}
In the context of the natural numbers, this definition
is well-founded and the justified interpretation is to-
tal. However, in any interpretation where the successor
function contains cycles, the justified interpretation is
partial.
Properties of definitions
Consistency of definitions
The aim of an inductive definition is to define its defined
predicates. Therefore, a natural quality requirement
is that those justified interpretations that are total in
the open predicates, should define truth of all defined
predicates, i.e. they should be total in all predicates.
As shown by Example 3 the property of having total
justified interpretations is context dependent.
Definition 5 A definition D is well-defining in a col-
lection I of total interpretations of its open predicates
iff each justified interpretation of D extending an ele-
ment of I is total. Otherwise, D is called an unfounded
definition in I.
Part of the knowledge representation methodology
for representing definitions is to show that each def-
inition in the theory is well-defining in the collection
of relevant interpretations of its open predicates. For
this purpose, practical mathematical techniques must
be developed.
Theorem 2 Assume that a theory T can be split up
in a sequence of theories T1, .., Tn such that for each i,
the predicates with a definition in Ti do not appear in
T1, .., Ti−1 and for each model I of T1 ∪ .. ∪ Ti−1, the
definitions in Ti are well-defining in I.
Then each justified interpretation of T , total for the
subset of predicates without definition in T , is total.
The proof of this theorem is omitted.
Some syntactic properties that guarantee that a def-
inition is well-defining in every context are well-known
from the logic programming literature:
• non-recursive definitions
• positive recursive definitions
• stratified definitions
Other properties guarantee well-defining definitions
in some specific context. Inductive definitions corre-
sponding to acyclic (Apt & Bezem 1990) or locally
stratified logic programs (Przymusinski 1988) are well-
defining in the context of Herbrand interpretations. It
follows from theorem 1 that a well-founded definition
in context I is also well-defining in I.
A syntactical criterion that guarantees well-
foundedness and hence well-defining-ness is the
following. Define a relativized definition w.r.t. some
strict order < as a definition of a predicate p(x, y) that
consists of rules:
p(x, t)← F [x]
such that each p-atom in F is of the form p(z, t
′
) and
appears in the scope of a subformula of F [x] of the form
∀z.z < x→ G or ∃z.z < x ∧G.
When < represents a well-founded order, relativized
definitions are well-founded and hence well-defining, by
theorem 1. The following theorem was proven.
Theorem 3 A relativized definition (w.r.t. to <) is
well-founded in each interpretation that interprets < as
a strict well-founded order.
Equivalence of definitions
In a logic for knowledge representation, there should be
a well-understood notion of equivalence. The following
example shows that one cannot simply replace bodies of
cases by equivalent bodies (w.r.t. 2-valued semantics).
Example 4 The definitions p :: { p← t } and p ::
{ p← p ∨ ¬p } have different justified interpretations,
respectively the interpretations (represented as literal
sets) {p} and {}. Note that their bodies are equiva-
lent w.r.t. 2-valued semantics but not w.r.t. 3-valued
semantics.
Some important cases of equivalence preserving rules
are sketched below:
• A case p(t[x])← F can be replaced by p(y)← ∃x.y =
t[x] ∧ F .
• In a definition, two cases p(t) ← F1 and p(t) ← F2
can be replaced by one case p(t)← F1∨F2. Together
with the first rule, it follows that replacing a set of
rules by its Clark completion is equivalence preserv-
ing.
• The substitution of a sub-formula F [x] in the body of
a case of a formula by a formula G[x] is equivalence
preserving if F [x] and G[x] are equivalent in 3-valued
logic, i.e. if ∀x.F [x]↔ G[x] is a tautology in 3-valued
logic6.
• Define the composition of two definitions Pred1 ::
{ C1 } and Pred2 :: { C2 } as the definition Pred1∪
Pred2 :: { C1 ∪ C2 }. In general, substituting a
pair of definitions by their composition is not equiv-
alence preserving. (Verbaeten, Denecker, & De Schr-
eye 2000) presents an extensive study of when merg-
ing definitions is equivalence preserving in the context
of open logic programming, a sub-formalism of the
logic defined here. One important example is that a
definition hierarchy (Definition 3) is equivalent with
its composition. Note that the composition of a def-
inition hierarchy of positive recursive definitions is a
stratified definition.
6Here the strong Kleene truth table for ↔ must be used.
Monotonicity, non-monotonicity and
modularity
Non-monotonicity is a necessary property of elabora-
tion tolerant logic descriptions (McCarthy 1998). Non-
monotonicity is a natural consequence of any sort of
closure principle. However, also a degree of monotonic-
ity is important in knowledge representation. Indeed, a
highly desirable feature of a knowledge representation
logic is that independent properties of the problem do-
main can be represented in a modular way, and that
adding the modules together in one theory preserves
the semantics of each module. Modular composition is
guaranteed if the models of the composition of the mod-
ules are models of the independent modules. However,
this property guarantees also that the extension of one
module with another is a monotonic operation.
Both properties are present in the logic defined here:
• Extending a definition with one or more new cases is
in general a non-monotonic operation.
• Adding new definitions or new axioms to a theory is
a monotonic operation. This follows trivially from
the definition of model.
Applications of definitions
Below some applications of ID-logic are given.
Terminological knowledge.
According to (Brachman & Levesque 1982), defini-
tions of terminology constitutes an important part
of expert knowledge. Terminological knowledge is
about the defining properties of a concept, i.e. the
necessary and sufficient conditions to belong to the
concept. To see the crucial difference between ter-
minological and assertional knowledge, consider the
atomic statement c(O) that some object O belongs
to a concept c. When c(O) represents an assertional
statement, it asserts that O belongs to c and, hence,
satisfies the defining property of c. On the other
hand, if the atom is added as a new case to the defini-
tion of c, then the defining property of c is modified
such that O belongs to c by definition and not by
virtue of its properties.
Temporal Reasoning.
In (Ternovskaia 1998), it was shown that Reiter’s sit-
uation calculus (Reiter 1991) has an equivalent for-
malization by a set of positive recursive definitions
of the fluent predicates and of the effects of actions.
Using general inductive definitions (with positive and
negative induction), the formalization can be further
simplified in ID-logic. Below, I sketch how to do this.
The definition defines all fluent symbols and all causal
predicates by simultaneous induction on the poset of
situations. I introduce for each fluent f three new
predicates: initiallyf to represent the initial state of
f , and causef and cause¬f , representing initiating
and terminating causes for f . For each fluent symbol
f , the definition contains three cases7:
f(x, S0)← initiallyf(x)
f(x, do(a, s))← causef(a, s, x)
f(x, do(a, s))← f(x, s) ∧ ¬cause¬f(a, s, x)
Note that in contrast to Reiter’s situation calculus,
this rule set does not contain a rule of the form:
¬f(x, do(a, s))← cause¬f(a, s, x)
However, it is easy to show that the completion of
the above 3 rules entails the formula:
¬f(do(a, s))← ¬causef (a, s, x) ∧ cause¬f(a, s, x)
which reduces to the causal rule for ¬f if the natural
requirement is added that an action cannot cause f
and ¬f in the same situation. This requirement is
formalised by the clause:
← cause¬f(a, s, x), causef (a, s, x)
This illustrates a general methodological principle of
using inductive definitions. In an inductive defini-
tion, one defines a concept by enumerating the pos-
itive cases; given such an enumeration, the closure
mechanism of the semantics yields the negative cases.
In addition, per initiating effect of some action rep-
resented by an action term A[y], there is a case:
causef(A[y], s, x)← Ψ[y, s, x]
such that the only term in Ψ of the situation sort is
s and it appears purely in fluent symbols. Likewise,
for each terminating effect there is a case:
cause¬f(A[y], s, x)← Ψ[y, s, x]
Theorem 4 A definition consisting of the above
rules is well-founded in the collection of all interpre-
tations that satisfy the Unique Names Axioms (UNA)
axioms (Reiter 1980) and the second order induction
axiom for the situation sort8.
It follows from theorem 1 that the semantics of this
inductive definition coincides with its Clark comple-
tion. Note that the completion of this definition is
very similar to Reiter’s state successor axioms 9.
7We assume a many-sorted version of ID-logic, with sit-
uation, action and user defined sorts.
8The order of the atoms, needed to establish the well-
foundedness of the definition is the order generated by
the atoms f(.., do(a, s)) > causef (a, s, ..), cause¬f (a, s, ..) >
g(.., s), with f , g arbitrary fluents.
9The main difference is that it lacks the action precondi-
tion predicate poss(a, s). Action preconditions can be added
to the inductive definition, by extending the definition with
cases defining poss, by adding the atom poss(a, s) as a con-
junct to the second and third case defining f and adding a
fourth rule
f(x, do(a, s))← fo(x, do(a, s)) ∧ ¬poss(a, s)
where fo is a new open predicate.
The inductive definition representation of situation
calculus in ID-logic represents initiating and termi-
nating effects in a case-by-case way. This results in
a modular, elaboration tolerant representation of the
domain in the sense that one can easily add new cases
or drop or refine existing ones. This definition can be
further extended with definitions for defined fluents,
e.g. the definition of the transitive closure of physical
connections in a computer network, in the context in
which these physical connections may change:
connected(c1, c2, s)← physical connection(c1, c2, s)
connected(c1, c2, s)← connected(c1, c3, s)∧
connected(c3, c2, s)
Also, similarly as in (Ternovskaia 1998), ramification
rules can be added to this theory.
Inductive definitions as an approach to Causal-
ity.
In (Denecker, Theseider Dupre´, & Van Belleghem
1998) we argued that inductive definitions are a suit-
able formalization of causality. Causality information
is an example of constructive information. Effects
and forces propagate in a dynamic system through a
constructive process in the following sense:
• there are no deus ex machina effects. Each effect
has a cause; it is caused by a nonempty combina-
tion of actions and other effects.
• The causation order among effects is a well-
ordering. I.e. there is no pair of effects each of
which have caused the other; stronger, there is no
infinite descending chain of effects each of which
has been caused by the previous one in the chain.
The construction process of an inductive definition
formally mimics this physical process of the propa-
gation of the causes and effects. Based on this idea,
(Denecker, Theseider Dupre´, & Van Belleghem 1998)
proposes a general solution to model ramifications.
One point of (Denecker, Theseider Dupre´, & Van Bel-
leghem 1998) was that effects may easily depend on
both presence and absence of other effects. For exam-
ple, in the case that one latch of a suitcase is open, the
effect of opening the second latch produces a derived
effect of opening the suitcase, but only if the first
latch is not closed simultaneously. As a consequence,
if fluents mutually can influence each other, descrip-
tions of ramifications may easily contain positive and
negative loops. As shown in (Denecker, Theseider
Dupre´, & Van Belleghem 1998), the well-founded se-
mantics deals well with these loops.
Induction axioms; Domain Closure Axiom
(DCA).
As a conservative extension of classical logic, ID-logic
assumes uncertainty on the domain of discourse (due
to the non-Herbrand interpretations). The Domain
Closure Axiom (DCA) expresses that the domain of
discourse contains only named objects. In (McCarthy
1980), McCarthy showed how the DCA can be rep-
resented by a combination of circumscription on a
set of rules and a FOL assertion. The mapping to
ID-logic is straightforward. The set of rules is an in-
ductive definition of a new predicate U ; it consists of
one case per constant C and per functor f :
U ::
{
U(C)←
..
U(f(x))← U(x1), .., U(xn)
}
This defines U as the set of all named objects. The
FOL axiom expresses that all objects in the domain
are named10:
∀x.U(x)
The DCA is a generalized induction axiom. In the
case of the language of the natural numbers (0 and
S/1), the above formalization of the DCA is equiva-
lent with Peano’s second order induction axiom. The
induction axiom for situations as needed in Reiter’s
situation calculus can be expressed in a similar way.
The semantics of many logics, e.g. logic programming
and deductive databases, is based on Herbrand inter-
pretations. This introduces the implicit ontological
constraint that all terms in the domain of discourse
are named. This constraint is absent in classical logic
and in ID-logic but can be explicitly formalized by
the pair of the DCA and the Unique Names Axioms
(UNA) (Reiter 1980) or the Clark Equality Theory
(CET) (Clark 1978). It is easy to show that each
model of DCA+UNA is isomorphic with a Herbrand
interpretation.
Tables.
The simplest way of defining a concept is by ex-
haustive enumeration of its elements. A table, as
in the context of databases, can naturally be viewed
as a definition by exhaustive enumeration. Tables
are commonly used to define concepts, not only in
databases but also in common sense knowledge rep-
resentation, e.g. to define some scenario.
Relationships to other logics.
ID-logic shows tight relationships with a class of differ-
ent logics in different areas of AI, computer science and
mathematical logic. Earlier in this paper, strong rela-
tions to circumscription and Clark completion came to
light. Despite differences in the syntactic sugar, there
are strong relationships between description logics and
ID-logic. ID-logic fits into the schema of description
logics, with a Tbox consisting of the definitions and an
Abox consisting of classical logic axioms. The corre-
spondence between description logics and a sub-logic of
ID-logic were formally investigated in (Van Belleghem,
Denecker, & De Schreye 1997).
10Note here the distinction between defining knowledge
and assertional knowledge. If one would add the FOL as-
sertion as a case to the inductive definition, then U would
be defined to be the complete domain of discourse.
Also fixpoint logic can be embedded in ID-logic, mod-
ulo syntactic sugar. The difference in syntactic sugar
is that in ID-logic, the defined concepts are named by
global predicate symbols, whereas in fixpoint logic, the
defined concepts are represented by an operator form11.
Inflationary fixpoint logic is an extension of fixpoint
logic for fixpoint forms with negation in it. However,
as mentioned in the introduction, this logic doesn’t give
the intended semantics to inductive definitions with
negation. For example, the concept of even numbers
is represented in ID-logic by:
even :: { even(x)← x = 0 ∨ ∃y.x = S(y) ∧ ¬even(y) }
The corresponding inflationary fixpoint form
ΓxΨ(x = 0 ∨ ∃y.x = S(y) ∧ ¬Ψ(y))
denotes the set of all natural numbers.
Logic Programming can be embedded in ID-logic in a
straightforward way. Some of its extensions can be em-
bedded as well. Abductive logic programming (Kakas,
Kowalski, & Toni 1993) (or open logic programming, as
it is called in (Denecker 1995)) can be embedded also
in ID-logic. An abductive logic framework is a triple
< A,P, T > of a set A of abducible predicates, a set
P of rules defining non-abducible predicates and a set
T of FOL axioms, called constraints. Its embedding in
ID-logic is trivial: it is the theory T ∪{Dp} where DP is
a definition with Rules(D) = P and with Defined(D)
the set of non-abducible predicates. In this embedding,
the semantics of an abductive logic program is given by
general non-Herbrand well-founded models.
The formalism of deductive databases (Abiteboul,
Hull, & Vianu 1995) descends from logic programming.
A deductive database consists of a triple (EDB,IDB,IC)
where EDB (extensional database) consists of tables for
extensional predicates, IDB (intensional database) con-
sists of a logic program defining intensional predicates
in terms of intensional and extensional predicates, and
IC (integrity constraints) is a set of FOL axioms. The
embedding of a deductive database in ID-logic consists
of a set of definitions (by exhaustive enumeration) for
the extensional predicates, a simultaneous definition for
the intensional predicates, the set IC as FOL axioms
and finally, the DCA+UNA.
ID-logic compared to NMR
As argued, definitional knowledge is an important com-
ponent of human expert knowledge. Such knowledge
11E.g. the transitive closure of a predicate p is represented
by the form:
Γ
(x,y)
Ψ (p(x, y) ∨ (∃z.Ψ(x, z) ∧Ψ(z, y)))
It corresponds to the ID-logic definition of a binary predicate
tr defined by:
tr ::
{
tr(x, y)← p(x, y) ∨ tr(x, z) ∧ tr(z, y)
}
consists of definitions of terminology but is not re-
stricted to that: e.g. induction axioms, knowledge of
physical causation, etc.. ID-logic is specifically designed
for representing such knowledge.
With respect to other applications such as the rep-
resentation of defaults, the scope and applicability of
inductive definitions is more restricted than other non-
monotonic principles such as circumscription and de-
fault logic. The use of definitions for such forms of com-
mon sense knowledge requires a more rigorous method-
ology of a priori analysis and restructuring of the knowl-
edge on the problem domain.
As mentioned earlier, Reiter (Reiter 1996) and Amati
et al (Amati, Carlucci Aiello, & Pirri 1997) observe that
compilation of non-monotonic theories into first order
definitions (in Beth’s style) can produce theories that
clarify the meaning of the original theories and are com-
putationally more attractive. Using the more general
notion of inductive definitions in ID-logic, this compi-
lation of non-monotonic theories to definitions becomes
easier and can be performed for larger classes of NMR
theories. Moreover, due to the non-monotonicity of the
logic, the compiled representation will often maintain
most of the elaboration tolerance of the original NMR
representation.
With respect to computational efficiency, reasoning
on ID-logic is undecidable in general, like in the case of
other predicate non-monotonic logics. However, there is
plenty of evidence that in many cases, definitions can be
reasoned on more efficiently that other non-monotonic
formalisms or even classical logic (e.g. constructing a
well-founded model of a propositional definition is poly-
nomial, while constructing a model of a propositional
theory is NP-complete). A common aspect of virtually
all logics related to ID-logic, is the strong focus on effi-
cient implementation. Techniques from these areas can
be used to implement efficient solvers.
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